Vern B. Millard v. Jesse H. Parry et al : Appellant\u27s Petition for Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1954
Vern B. Millard v. Jesse H. Parry et al : Appellant's
Petition for Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Paul E. Reimann; Attorney for Appellant;
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Millard v. Parry, No. 8026 (Utah Supreme Court, 1954).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2026
! 
~ 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
VERN B. MILLARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JESSE H. PARRY AND ELSIE H. PAR-
RY, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
STRAND ELECTRIC SERVICE COM-
pANY, A Corporation, and OTTO 
DREWS, 
Defendants. 
No. 8026 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
fi;lLEfD 
AUG 5 1]54 PAUL E. REIMANN, 
---. Attorney for Appellant. 
r .. erK., S:.!premf" ;r~~ n_;;.~, ·u~:;;·· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR RE-
Pages 
3- 4 
HEARING ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5-19 
ARGUMENT: 
Point 1: The opinion of the Court and the affirm-
ance of the judgment, are predicated on substantial 
misstatements and omissions of material undisputed 
evidence ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 5-10 
Point 2: The Court has in effect denied the plain-
tiff his constitutional right of appeal by predicating 
its decision on a state of facts materially at variance 
with the record made in the district court. ______________ 10 
Point 3: The opinion disregards one of the flagrant 
errors of the trial court by ignoring the distinction 
between recovery for changes on the basis of cost 
plus 10% as agreed upon, and the much lower basis 
of "reasonable value" adopted by the lower court. __ 10-11 
Point 4: The decision is contrary to law.-------------------- 12-15 
Point 5: The decision misconstrues the stipulation 
of the parties, and exceeds the jurisdiction of this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Court by reaching out to cover a portion of the judg-
ment from which no appeal was taken. ---------------- 16 
Point 6: The denial of interest on sums due and 
owing to plaintiff is contrary to law, and amounts 
to making a contract for the parties without any 
meeting of minds. ---------------------------------------------------- 16-17 
CON CL USI 0 N ------------------------------------------------------------------ 18-19 
CITATION OF AUTHORITIES 
9 Amer. Jur. p. 7 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
J 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
VERN B. MILLARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JESSE H. PARRY and ELSIE H. PAR-
RY, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
STRAND ELECTRIC SERVICE COM-
pANY, A Corporation, a n d OTTO 
DREWS, 
Defendants. 
No. 8026 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION. FOR REHEARING 
The appellant Vern B. Millard respectfully moves this 
Honorable Court to vacate its decision heretofore entered in 
this case, and appellant petitions this Court to grant him a re-
hearing upon the following grounds and for reasons set forth 
hereinafter: 
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1. The opinion of the Court and the affirmance of the 
judgment, are predicated on substantial misstatements and omis-
sions of material undisputed evidence. 
2. The Court has in effect denied the plaintiff his con-
stitutional right of appeal by predicating its decision on a state 
of facts materially at variance with the record made in the dis-
trict court. 
3. The opinion disregards one of the flagrant errors of 
the trial court by ignoring the distinction between recovery for 
changes on the basis of cost plus 10% as agreed upon, and the 
much lower basis of "reasonable value" adopted by the lower 
court. 
4. The decision is contrary to law. 
5. The decision misconstrues the stipulation of the par-
ties, and exceeds the jurisdiction of this Court by reaching out 
to cover a portion of the judgment from which no appeal was 
taken. 
6. The denial of interest on sums due and owing to 
plaintiff is contrary to law, and amounts to making a contract 
for the parties without any meeting of minds. 
WHEREOF, appellant respectfully requests that the de-
cision be vacated and that the Court grant a rehearing both as 
to the facts and the law, for the reason that there is a serious 
miscarriage of justice by the decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL E. REIMANN, 
Attorney for the Appellant. 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1: 
The opinion of the Court and the affirmance of 
the judgment, are predicated on substantial misstate-
ments and omissions of material undisputed evidence. 
Notwithstanding the high esteem in which counsel for 
appellant holds the writer of the decision, the opinion is er-
roneous both as to the facts and the law. Counsel for appellant 
respectfully requests this Honorable Court to re-read the Brief 
of Appellant, and also the Reply Brief of Appellant wherein 
appellant points out various assertions which respondents make 
in their brief whch contradict the record. Counsel for appellant 
painstakingly pointed out by specific reference to the record on 
appeal wherein respondents misquote or otherwise misstate the 
facts. Nevertheless the opinion contradicts the record, and 
thereby creates disputed ''issues of fact'' in instances where there 
were no disputes. The injury to plaintiff amounts to more than 
$18,000.00, which is sufficient to wipe out the appellant's work-
ing capital, when he was the innocent victim of the mistakes of 
the owner and his architect. 
In this case the appellant started with a construction proj-
ect which was to cost $82,000.00, which ultimately cost appel-
lant as contractor more than $111,000.00, by reason of mistakes 
of respondent's architect and in consequence of numerous 
changes demanded by the owners. There was no dispute as to 
the fact that the building as actually built, was reasonably worth 
$116,000.00. The opinion of the Court makes the contractor 
the victim, although he was the innocent party. 
On page 2, last paragraph, it is stated contrary to the 
record: 
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" ... It must also noted that in the matters referred 
to, plaintiff rlies chiefly upon alleged promises and 
representations of the architect, and upon the contention 
that the architect was the agent for the defendants. An 
architect is not ordinarily a g~neral agent of his em-
ployer (3 Am. Jur. 1000) and in this instance it was 
expressly so provided in the contract documents. Clear-
ly he did not have authority to bind Parry on a promise 
of construction of another structure." 
The statement is not only an unfair statement of the con-
tention of appellant, but it contradicts the findings submitted 
by respondents and adopted by the trial court to the effect tha 
the architect was the agent of defendants Parry when he asked 
the plaintiff to submit a bid. Finding of Fact No. 5 so recites: 
"That the plaintiff on or about the lOth day of Jan-
uary 1951, was requested by the defendants Parry agent 
and architect, Leroy W. Johnson to enter into a writ-
ten contract with the said defendant Jesse H. Parry ... " 
The writer of the poinion says that the architect was not 
the agent of the owners under the terms of the contract docu-
ments. That is not the contention of appellant. Even if the archi-
tect was a supervisor under the contract documents, that fact 
does not alter the admitted and undisputed fact that prior to 
the signing of the contract documents the architect was the 
agent of the owners, and Jesse H. Parry so admitted and the 
court found that to be the fact. The opinion contra_dicts para-
graph 5 of the findings which clearly recite that prior to the 
signing of the contract documents, the architect was the agent 
of the owners. That particular portion of the finding w,as not 
before this Court for review. 
While the architect was the agent of the owners, his repre-
sentations and instructions to Mr. Millard as to what should be 
6 
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included in the bid and what was to be excluded, were the 
representations and instructions of the owners. 
Defendant Parry testified that he hired the architect about 
December 1st. He admitted that he left various matters to the 
architect, as that is "what I hired him for." Even the architect 
called as a witness for defendants testified that the architect 
controls the bidding and the contractor is supposed to follow 
the directions of the architect. (R. 85 3-85 5). The architect pro-
cured a bid on plumbing and told Mr. Millard to base his bid 
on that figure. He also told Mr. Millard to exclude sewer as 
that was to be covered by another construction project. It is un-
disputed that the contract documents reserve to the owner the 
right to let other contracts, (Exhibit P-3). 
The opinion on page 3 further misstates the record: 
"Plaintiff's sixth point is that even if the contract 
were not voidable it could not be construed to require 
plaintiff to furnish items in excess of those on which 
the architect, as agent of the owners, instructed plain-
tiff to base his bid. We find no merit to this point. The 
items complained of were described and included with-
in the written specifications and we find no reason to 
reject the trial court's finding that they were not in-
tended to be eliminated. It would constitute a strange 
departure from the rule relating to the effect of a writ-
ten contract to sustain the contention of plaintiff on this 
point. Also, the architect, testifying as plaintiff's wit-
ness, stated that the estimates on plumbing furnished by 
him to plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's bid included 
cost of water and sewer connections which is one of 
the chief items objected to by plaintiff under this head." 
Appellant respectfully submit that the Court has misstated 
the record to the prejudice of the rights of plaintiff. The Court 
has adopted a misstatement of the respondents and has disre-
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garded the plain facts of the record. The exhibit in question 
which was submitted bf the architect to plaintiff (Exhibit P-4) 
expressly states: "This does not include sewer or water meter 
service." The Court must have overlooked said instrument. Con-
trary to the statement in the opinion, the architect did not state 
that the bid included water and sewer connections. The opinion 
likewise does not mention the fact that defendant Parry had in 
his possession Exhibit D-27 dated December 14, 1950, which 
stated as the cost of the plumbing the eract amount of Erhibit 
P-4 which specifically declared that sewer and water were not· 
included. Said Exhibit also stated the heating allowance. When 
the heating was decided upon after the contract documents were 
signed, the heating costs were in excess of the allowance which 
the architect instructed Mr. Millard to provide in his bid. 
The Court in the opinion has overlooked the facts which 
show that the contractor was the victim of the instructions given 
by the owners' agent in the submission of his bid, and the further 
fact that the contractor's bid was originally $90,000.00, then 
reduced to $85,212 on the direction to exclude sewer and water 
lines and rely on the Barnes bid, and to limit the heating allow-
ance. Finally the architect induced the contractor to reduce his 
bid still more by $3,212 by the assurance that he would be 
awarded construction of the second project. 
The point which the writer of the opinion has inadvertently 
overlooked is that a party who requests another person to omit · 
items from his bid (whether he does so by agent or personally) 
cannot later be heard to say that those items were contracted for, 
since there· has been no meeting of the minds for their inclu-
sion. Furthermore,· contrary to the statement in the opinion, the 
contract documents did not require inclusion of those items in 
the performance by the general contractor. Exhibit P-3, page 34 
actually provides: 
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"Provide all necessary materials and labor for the 
installation of 4" diameter soil pipe sewer from the 
building and connecting to the city sewer as shown on 
the plot plan.'' 
It is undisputed that there was no plot plan in existence 
when the contract document was signed. Exhibit 16, a plot plan 
which shows sewer, clearly shows that the sewer was intended 
to be part of another construction project. The defendant Parry 
identified a letter dated July 1951 from the architect which 
states that the sewer was not included in the original construc-
tion project. 
No plot plan of a sewer ever came into existence as a part 
of construction project No. 1. When defendant Parry con-
structed the sewer, he did not use soil pipe, which is the least 
expensive type of construction, but he used cast iron which cost 
several times more, and instead of laying the line directly to 
the street as shown on the master plan, he ran it diagonally and 
much deeper which made the line considerably longer and more 
costly. (R. 762-763). Yet, the trial court gave credit for the 
entire cost of the sewer with expensive cast iron pipe, which 
amounted to "adding insult to injury." 
"Plaintiffs final point is that the court erred in 
failing to allow, even as extras, costs incurred by plain-
tiff through the conduct of defendants an dtheir archi-
tect and also in its findings as to costs of extras which 
were to be paid for on a cost-plus basis. It appears from 
the detailed findings that the trial court went into the 
matter of extras very meticulously and we have not 
found anything to justify us in disturbing such find-
ings ... '' 
The reason the Court did not find anything to disturb the 
findings is poi!sibly because the Court overlooked the fact that 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the trial court based its allowance not on cost-plus 10% but on 
a theory of "reasonable value," which amounted to only a small 
fraction of actual costs incurred by plaintiff. The real issue is 
not even discussed in the opinion. The trial court did not allow 
plaintiff recovery on the basis of actual costs plus 10% for the 
changes. 
There are other matters in the opinion which are not ac-
curately stated, but the facts misstated or omitted as hereinabove 
referred to affect the plaintiff to the extent of more than 
$18,000.00. 
Point 2: 
The Court has in effect denied the plaintiff his con-
stitutional right of appeal by predicating its decision 
on a state of facts materially at variance with the record 
made in the district court. 
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution of Utah not 
only provides for a right of appeal, but specifies: "The appeal 
shall be upon the record made in the court below." It seems to 
counsel for appellant that where the Court on appeal is in sub-
stantial error in its statement of the facts by material variance 
from the facts established in the district court, there ought to be 
a rehearing, for an opinion of the Court predicated upon al-
leged facts which are not the actual facts of the case, for all 
practical purposes is a denial of the right of appeal since it is 
not a review of the record made in the district court. 
Point 3·: 
The opinion disregards one of the flagrant errors 
of the trial court by ignoring the distinction between 
10 
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'ljl 
recovery for changes on the basis of cost plus 10% 
as agreed upon, and the much lower basis of rrreason-
able value" adopted by the lower court. 
The opinion side-steps Point 8 in the Brief of Appellant by 
the highly inaccurate comment that "the trial court went into 
the matter of extras very meticulously and we have not found 
anything to justify us in disturbing such findings." The Court 
should have observed the error, for the simple reason that not-
withstanding the defendants testified that for extras and changes 
the contractor was to be paid "cost plus 10%," and notwith-
standing the trial court found numerous items were changes and 
extras, the trial court scaled down recovery therefor to a small 
fraction of the actual cost in most instances on the theory that 
plaintiff was only entitled to "reasonable allowance." As 
pointed out in the Brief of Appellant that scaling down process 
by trial court injured plaintiff to the extent of thousands of 
dallars. 
The Brief of Appellant cites the cases which clearly point 
out the distinction between agreements to recover on a cost-
plus basis and those which merely allow "reasonable value.'' 
Those citations merit re-examination. 
In effect, the trial court said Mr. Millard was entitled to 
his actual costs plus 10% as even the defendants testified that 
such was the agreement, but in contradiction of such decision, 
the court deprived Mr. Millard of thousands of dollars of his 
actual costs by allowing him only a small fraction thereof. The 
opinion of this Honorable Court seems to miss that point alto-
gether, and it is respec~fully requested that the Court re-read 
the Brief of Appellant and the Reply Brief, as counsel for ap· 
pellant meticulously presented both the facts and the law whic~ 
have been overlooked in the decision. 
~ I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Point 4: 
The decision is contrary to law. 
First, the decision is wrong and grievously unjust because 
it is predicated upon false premises. Secondly, the decision ap-
plies the wrong rules because it has the wrong facts. 
At the time the architect requested appellant to bid on 
construction and when he gave the specific instructions as to 
what items were to be excluded from the bid and what allow-
ances to make for specific items, the architect was the agent for 
the owners. He was hired for doing that type of work as well 
as to draw plans and to prepare specifications. The appellant 
had a duty to follow those directions. It cannot be said with any 
semblance of candor that he did not rely on what the architect 
told him. The contractor was not injured by miscalculations of 
his own employees. The contractor was injured to the extent 
of more than $20,000.00 by reason of the instructions and rep-
resentations of the agent of the owners. 
It makes no difference whether the agent was specifically 
directed by the owners to make the particular statements he 
made. The fact is that he was engaged to line up materials 
(which is one of the functions of the general contractor) . He 
got a plumbing bid for the owners, which specifically excluded 
water and sewer connections. Said agent got the original bid of 
plaintiff reduced from $90,000.00 to $82,000.00 upon his in-
structions to limit allowances for specific items and to exclude 
other items. As agent for the owners, in the pressure to meet 
deadlines he made numerous mistakes and contradictions. The 
owners bargained for construction worth $82,000.00 and they 
wound up with construction worth $116,000.00 which cost the 
contractor more than $111,000.00 without even any allowance 
for his services. 
12 
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Under elementary rules of agency, the owners were responsi-
ble for all of the representations and statements of the archi-
. teet. They obtained the benefits. The contractor was the inno-
cent party, and he is entitled as a matter of equity to rescission, 
and to idemnification. 
· Equity even relieves a contractor of a mistake in a bid. 
(9 Am. Jur. p. 7). However, in this case the contractor made 
the type of bid he was instructed to make, and he reduced his 
bid on the representations of the agent of owner. To permit the 
innocent contractor to get rrstuck" is shocking and unconscion-
able, as it amounts to a device whereby an owner gets rrsome-
thing for nothing." 
Even if there were any substance to the contention that the 
owners did not authorize their agent to give the instructions to 
Mr. Millard which induced him to scale his bid down succes-
sively by a total of $8,000.00, since the architect admittedly 
performs the function of giving directions on how to bid, all 
such an argument could establish is that there was no meeting 
of the minds and hence no valid contract. 
There has been a serious miscarriage of justice in this 
case: (a) The owners obtained a lower bid by reason of in-
structions and representations of their agent. (b) The mistakes 
and incompleteness in the plans prepared by the owners' agent 
necessitated numerous changes, and the trial court allowed only 
a fraction of the costs. (c) The owners themselves demanded 
numerous changes and additions which greatly increased the 
cost, and the trial court disregarded the owners' admission that 
they were to pay cost plus 10%, and allowed only a fraction of 
the actual costs on a theory of "reasonable allowance," con-
trary to the adjudicated cases. 
13 
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The plaintiff is injured to the extent of approximately 
$20,000.00 by making him the victim of the owners' agent's in-
structions, and by denying him full recovery on the basis of 
actual cost plus 10% and by substitution of the "reasonable 
allowance" theory which gives the owners a free ride to the 
extent of thousands of dollars. Equity does not countenance 
unjust enrichment. Even if the owners had been entitled to 
complain about their own agent's act, as between innocent 
parties, the plaintiff as the victim was entitled to be made 
whole, particularly when those acts and instructions and rep-
resentations of the agent enured to the benefit of owners by 
thousands of dollars. 
This is not a case where the contractor bungled. He did 
a good job. It cost a lot of money to correct the mistakes in 
the architect's plans. He did not engage in any controversy with 
the owners. This Court leaves the contractor holding the bag 
by simply contradicting the finding of the court that the archi-
tect was the agent of the owners. Certainly, the briefs submitted 
by appellant deserve re-reading, as they were prepared pains-
takingly. 
There is no justice in referring to an uncontradicted situ-
ation as a disputed question of fact. Regardless of what a wit-
ness may say on direct examination, when on cross-examination 
he admits that a party was his agent and that he was hired for 
that purpose any possible conflict is resolved, for the rr testi-
mony of a witness is no stronger than where it is left on 
cross-examination." But when the court finds that the archi-
teCt was the agent of the owner, and neither party has made 
an isue of it and the owners have submitted such a finding, 
why should this Court contradict it when it cannot possibly 
be an issue on any phase of the appeal taken from only a por-
tion of the judgment? 
14 
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The opinion contradicts the express terms of written in-
struments, as illustrated by the comment on Exhibit P-3, and 
Exhibit P-4. One exhibit consisted of the court file, LeRoy W. 
Johnson v. J. H. Parry, Case No. 94041, shows a counterclaim 
filed February 13, 1952, which recites (and which was ad-
mitted by reply) : 
"That on or about December 14, 1950, plaintiff 
and defendant entered into an oral contract for archi-
tectural and supervisory service covering the erection 
of an 11 unit apartment at the rear of 160 South 13th 
East Street, Salt Lake City, Utah." 
The trial court erroneously excluded said exhibit as being 
"immaterial" although it should that the agency of the archi-
tect for owners arose December 14, 1950, or a date prior to the 
date when he gave the instructions to Mr. Millard as to how to 
prepare his bids. Notwithstanding the trial judge excluded 
said exhibit, he was forced to the conclusion that the architect 
was the agent of the Parrys, during a period of a month or more 
prior to the execution of the so-called montract documents. 
After reaching that conclusion, however, he made the victim 
responsible for his loss by saying in substance that he should 
not have paid any attention to those directions although the 
owners testified that the contractor was supposed to follow 
directions and instructions of the architect and their own archi-
tect hired as an expert witness admitted that the architect 
controls the bidding and that the contractor is supposed to 
follow the directions of the architect on how to bid. By disre-
garding those irrefutable facts, this Court in its opiniqn has 
overlooked entirely the law applicable thereto, and it has con-
doned the injustice to the contractor as the innocent victim. 
15 
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Point 5: 
The decision misconstrues the stipulation of the 
parties, and exceeds the jurisdiction of this Court by 
reaching out to cover a portion of the judgment from 
which no appeal was taken. ) 
The second paragraph of the op1n10n is an incorrect 1 
statement of the stipulation which was entered into after trial 
to enable the owners to stop the running of interest. There 
was no appeal from the judgment dismissing the counterclaim 
of defendants. The opinion infers that the appellant stipulated 
to entry of judgment against plaintiff for $435.30, as the 
amount paid, when such was not the case. The stipulation has 
been misconstrued. The Parrys willfully delayed payment for 
d d f I' .1' two years an cause the running up o interest and costs, and the Court unjustly makes the plaintiff liable for the defaults 
of the Parrys. 
Point 6: 
The denial of interest on sums due and owing to 
plaintiff is contrary to law, and amounts to making 
a contract for the parties without any meeting of 
minds. ] !! 
The fourth paragraph of the opinion denies plaintiff re- I B 
covery of interest, b u t such denial is predicated u p o n an · 
incorrect statement of the record. The opinion states that the j ro 
plaintiff billed defendants on the wrong basis, and that there-
1 
fore interest did not accrue. It was admitted by the parties that ili 
plaintiff was entitled to recover for changes and extras on a 
basis of cost plus 10%. The worst objection which could be I 
made to the billing, is that it was excessive since it covered ID' 
total costs. Billing for an excessive amount does not stop the M 
16 
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running of interest. No case can be found to that effect. The 
contract document required payment in full within 30 days 
after completion of construction. Completion was bound to 
cover extras and changes. Defendants ordered most of the 
changes and knew about them. The billing rendered was ac-
companied by a letter inviting the defendants to confer on the 
matter with counsel for plaintiff. They voiced no objection. 
They made no contention until the time of trial that the billing 
was incorrect. On the contrary, they made specific payments in 
accordance with the privisions of the letter which accompanied 
that bill. The statement which the Court quotes for "removal of 
liens" is not in point at all, for the liens which were filed were 
due to the willful failure of the defendants to pay promptly 
or at all. Said quoted provision, although not applicable does 
not provide that interest shall be suspended. 
There is nothing in the contract document which states 
that if the billing is incorrect or excessive, that the obligors 
shall be exempted from payment of interest. In several days 
of research, counsel has been unable to find a case to support 
the novel theory in the opinion. 
Counsel for appellant has cited the applicable interest 
statutes. The Court by implication amends those statutes, which 
is not the function of this Court but within the sole province 
of the legislature. Under the statute the plaintiff was entitled 
to interest. 
The effect of the opinion is to make a contract between 
the parties to which plaintiff never assented. 
The balance of the decision is just as bad, but the amounts 
involved are relative minor, neverthel~s a careful re-reading 
of the briefs is requested. 
17 
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CONCLUSION 
The facts are incorrectly stated in the opinion, which indi-
cates that the Court has a misapprehension of the record on 
appeal. The recitals in the opinion contradicts the undisputed 
facts in the record. The results of such substantial departures 
from the record, is the application of incorrect rules of law, 
and the denial of plaintiff of the judicial relief to which he 
is justly entitled. 
Counsel for appellant realizes that under the pressure of 
a large volume of work the Court can and does make mis-
takes, and counsel has the duty to apprise the Court of such 
errors which result in a miscarriage of justice. The loss of 
$18,000.00 might be insignificant in some quarters, but to a 
contractor who has that much tied up in a job as part of the 
costs of construction, is a serious matter. He has not asked for 
relief from blunders made by his employees. He has asked for 
relief from the circumstances in which he has been placed in 
good faith on his part by following the instructions and adher-
ing to the representations of the agent of the owners and by 
making numerous costly changes requested by the owners 
themselves. He is the victim of application of the wrong meas-
ure of indemnification. T h e owners obtained a completed 
construction worth $34,000.00 more than they originally bar-
gained. There is no equitable basis for making the contractor 
responsibile financially for the instructions given by the agent 
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of the owner which lopped $8,000.00 off his bid nor to make 
him bear the major cost of changes ordered by the owners. 
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully prays that the de-
cision heretofore entered be vacated, and that a rehearing be 
granted in this cause, and that this Honorable Court re-examine 
the record on appeal and the briefs of appellant upon rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL E. REIMANN, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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